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Abstract
This paper examines how Islamic revival has progressed in China since economic 
reform by focusing on the activities of an urban Hui Muslim Internet community in 
Yunnan province. Since the late 1970s, there have been two clear tendencies in Hui 
society. One is the rise in secularization amongst many Hui Muslims through social 
change; for example the dissolution of traditional Hui communities and intensified 
interaction between Hui and Han Chinese in daily life. Another is Islamization amongst 
certain Hui, brought about through a relaxation of religious policies. These contrasting 
trends mean that many Hui people do not share a sense of religiosity. Seemingly, they 
lack a point of contact. However, the Hui Muslim Internet community connects them 
through diverse activities and intents, from meeting prospective marriage partners to 
the doctrinal development of Islam. Additionally, Hui Muslims associated via the Web 
engage in Islamic revival movements such as establishing Waqf (Muslim endowments). 
This suggests a new comprehension of Islamic revival, one which does not reduce 
such movements to a sense of religiosity. As the new associations connect diverse Hui 
Muslims, the Islamic revival movements develop in entanglements of both the Islamic 
and the secular and not from mere Islamization alone.
Keywords: Islamic revival, internet, Waqf activities, Hui people, China
要旨
本論は、雲南省の都市部の回族ムスリムのインターネット・コミュニティの活
動に焦点を当て、「改革・開放」以降の中国においてイスラーム復興がいかに
進展してきたのかについて考察を行う。1970年代末以降、回族社会には2つの
傾向がある。一つは、伝統的な回族コミュニティの解体や日常生活における回
族と漢族の関係の深まりなどの社会変容による回族ムスリムの多くに見られる
世俗化の進展である。もう一つは、宗教政策の緩和によりもたらされた回族の
一部のイスラーム化である。これらの対照的な傾向は多くの回族たちがムスリ
ムとしての宗教意識や生活様式を共有しないことを意味する。そのため、一見
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すると彼らには日常生活において接点がないように見える。しかし、回族ムス
リムのインターネット・コミュニティは、結婚相手探しやイスラームの発展な
どといった彼らの多様な意図を結びつけることにより、彼らの間に新たなつな
がりを創出する。さらに、ウェブを通じて結びついた回族ムスリムはワクフ（ム
スリムの寄金）設立などのイスラーム復興運動を担っていく。こうした事例は、
イスラーム復興を宗教意識へと還元しない新たな理解を示唆するものである。
多様な回族ムスリムを結びつけるこうした新たなつながりとして、イスラーム
復興運動は、単なるイスラーム化ではなく、イスラーム的なものと世俗的なも
のとの両方がもつれ合いを通して展開しているのである。
キーワード：イスラーム復興、　インターネット、　ワクフ活動、　回族、　中国
Introduction
As the Arab Spring movement of 2010 underscored, the influence of the Internet in 
formulating political collectives is increasingly growing. China is no exception. The 
number of Internet users has rapidly increased over the last ten years in China. For 
instance, the number of Internet users has jumped from 45.8 million in June 2002 
(CNNIC 2002: 4) to 537.6 million in June 2012 (CNNIC 2012: 10). In other words, 
Internet users have increased more than tenfold over the last decade. The rapid spread 
of Internet use in China has influenced everything including, as in other regions of 
the globe, the religious sphere. For example, Muslims, with the notable exception of 
the Islamic clergy,1 are increasingly able to gain easier access to religious knowledge2 
because of the spread of new media technologies.3 This started with the Internet, 
and then spread via CD, MP3 and so on. Such technological changes have enabled 
numerous Muslims to learn about Islam by themselves.4 Therefore such changes 
brought about a steep decline in the monopoly of Islamic knowledge from the clergy.5 
The relationship between religion and media has recently received much attention 
in Islamic studies and religious studies in general (Meyer and Moors 2006).6 Turner 
argued urban Muslims became able to access “fatwas on the Internet which offer 
guidance on everything relating to Islamic banking, appropriate holiday destinations, 
diet, veiling, schooling and clothing” (Turner 2010: 19). Yagi (2011) also argued that 
the emergence of popular Internet usage facilitated access to religious information 
(such as fatwa, scriptures, and similar faith concerned materials). Moreover, she 
contended that this opened a new religious discursive space for Muslims beyond the 
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clergy. These important points made by Turner and Yagi should not be dismissed when 
the relationship between Islam and the Internet is discussed. However, these scholarly 
works tend to interpret the inﬂuence of the Internet on Islam as a mere facilitation of 
Islamic revival movements. Moreover, they are likely to support a popular inclination 
to simply reduce the character of Islamic revival movements only to Islam as a faith or 
belief system. Such a tendency is common with other works on contemporary Islamic 
revival (Mahmood 2005).
There is no doubt that Islamic revival has attracted attention beyond the Islamic world, 
especially since the late 1970s and the Iranian Islamic Revolution. In sum, Islamic 
studies have generally embraced a paradigm whereby Islamism is viewed as coincident 
with Western modernity.7 Alternatively, the perspective that Islam is incompatible 
with modernity,8 especially after the late 1970s, is emphasized.9 However, both tend to 
interpret Islamic revival movements assuming that Muslims were religiously awakened 
to their Muslim identities through an engagement with belief or faith. In other words, 
many researchers have been inclined to deduce that the essential character of Islamic 
revival movements comes from Islam or a sense of religion, as in the studies of religion 
and media cited above. For example, Nagata, who carried out fieldwork in Malaysia 
from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, argued that young Muslims who received 
higher education in institutions such as universities in urban areas were perceived to 
be ‘religiously defective’ due to the perceived influences of Malay culture that they 
encountered. In fact, through communication with their colleagues and schoolmates 
from Islamic states such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Libya, many actually became 
more ambitious to improve their knowledge of Islam. Moreover, this experience often 
intensified their identity as Muslim by underscoring that their faith has universal 
signiﬁcance as against their Malay regional identity. Therefore, young urban Muslims 
participated in Dakwah movements, and went to rural areas to challenge the traditional 
religious authority of ulama who were influenced by non-Islamic indigenous Malay 
customs (Nagata 1982: 48-49). In the case of Chinese Muslims, Gillette’s 1990s 
research in Xi’an, focusing on the consumption patterns of Hui people, argues that Hui 
people challenge the evolutionism ideology of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) 
which subordinates them to Han people, through using Islamization (or Arabization) as 
a marker (Gillette 2000). One of Gillette’s key ethnographic cases is the anti-alcohol 
movement. According to her, this movement was started through a call by some of the 
clergy who felt a sense of crisis because certain halāl restaurants (Qingzhen Shitang) 
were selling alcohol and young Muslims were drinking alcohol in a Muslim dominant 
district. Due to this situation Muslims in agreement with the clergy held study meetings 
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to improve Islamic knowledge, or to spread Islamic orthodoxy, and expanded anti-
alcohol movements around the district (Gillette 2000: 167-191).
Thus, the dominant interpretation in previous literature has been a tendency to over-
privilege doctrinal aspects of Islam in Islamic revival movements. Of course, many 
studies make key points in relation to the research of Islam in contemporary society 
overall and so ought not to be dismissed outright. According to Bayat, however, 
previous literature regarding Islamic revival movements greatly depended upon the 
dominant and totalizing discourses of Islamist leaders and so overlooked the fact that 
these movements “possess various layers of activism and constituency (leaders, cadres, 
members, sympathizers, free riders, and so on) who are likely to exhibit different 
perceptions about the aims and objectives of their activities” (Bayat 2005: 900). Thus, 
he proposed a more ﬂuid and fragmented interpretation of Islamic revival movements. 
More to the point, he argued that social movements including Islamist movements 
were carried out by groups whose collectivity was ensured through “partially shared 
interests” (Bayat 2005: 901-902). These groups can be conceptualized as impromptu 
public collectives or assemblages. Moreover, since Bayat’s telling study a broader 
range of new religious interpreters has emerged, beyond ulama control, through the 
Internet. This is because the Internet forms “a continuum instead of a dichotomization 
between elite and mass, literate and folk” (Anderson 2003). These arguments are very 
important to consider when interpreting Islamic revival movements. Because Bayat 
and Anderson did not offer readers a concrete case, it is not entirely clear how partially 
shared interests, or such a continuum amongst diverse actors, develop. Or further, 
how such actors form collectives that develop into Islamic revival movements. It is 
necessary to examine these points in specific local contexts in order to reveal such 
characteristics of the Islamic revival movement.
Based on the above-mentioned research, this article will examine how Islamic revival 
movements have progressed in contemporary China by focusing on the actual activities 
of an urban Hui Muslim10 Internet community in Yunnan province, an area where Internet 
use has been rapidly spreading since the late 1990s. I will examine how heterogeneous 
actors (such as pious Muslims and secular Muslims), who do not share a sense of 
religiosity or contact in their everyday lives, are associated through daily mundane 
activities such as recreation, in the online Muslim community. These fragmented 
collectives have led to Islamic revival movements. In short, I will explain how Islamic 
revival has progressed without denying involvement of the secular in the process.
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The following section will demonstrate how the Hui Muslim society has followed two 
simultaneous yet contrary trends since economic reform: Islamization and Hanization 
(that is to say, being assimilated into the everyday life of Han society), and how these 
social changes have brought about the fragmentation of Hui Muslim society. The third 
section of this article will describe the diversity of Hui Muslims; discussing those who 
do not share a sense of religiosity or lifestyle as Muslim yet remain partially associated 
through mundane and tangible secular activities such as hiking, meeting for dinner, 
sports activities and so on. Such meetings are often based on involvement in the Hui 
Internet community, and these partial or selective associations have led to Islamic 
revival movements such as offering aid and support to Hui living in deprived areas 
or helping out elderly Muslims in need. Subsequently, the last section will examine 
the process of how Islamic revival movements evolve in contemporary China. It will 
discuss the social effects of the Internet on movements related to the aforementioned 
two contrary tendencies of change in Hui Muslim society.
This article is based on fieldwork conducted in urban areas of Kunming, Yunnan 
province, China. Research was carried out from February 2008 to March 2010, and 
again from December 2010 to January 2011.11 My research focuses on the Hui people.12 
Hui society, culture, and politics have been shaped through historical intermarriage 
between foreign Muslims, for example Arabs, Persians, and Turks who migrated to 
China from the Tang dynasty until the Yuan dynasty, and Chinese Han people who have 
converted to Islam (Gladney 1996: 16-21; De Angelis 1997: 151-155). There are about 
140,000 Hui people in Kunming, which is about 2.3 percent of the total population 
(Kunming-shi Zongjiao Shiwu-ju and Kunming-shi Yisilan-jiao Xiehui (eds.) 2005: 11). 
There are six mosques and eighteen members of the clergy in urban Kunming. My 
ﬁeldwork was carried out in the mosques and also conducted in informal spheres such 
as halāl restaurants, the ofﬁces of private companies, and similar non-ofﬁcial spaces. 
Taking into account that religion is one of many sensitive issues in China, the reader 
should note that I have opted to use pseudonyms for people and places in order to 
protect my informants.
1. Polarization in Hui Muslim society
Since economic reform, there have been two clear tendencies in Hui society. One is 
the rise in Hanization amongst many Hui Muslims through social change since the 
late 1970s. This shift has been brought about, for example, through the dissolution of 
traditional Hui communities and intensiﬁed relations between Hui and Han Chinese in 
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daily life. Another key driver of change has been the Islamization of part of Hui society 
through a relaxation of state religious policies. Recently, furthermore, the inﬂuence of 
Salaﬁ religious discourse has become increasingly powerful. This section will give an 
overview of the two contrary tendencies of Hanization and Islamization in changing Hui 
Muslim society throughout the Post-Mao era in order to better understand ethnographic 
cases regarding the Hui Muslim Internet community in the sections following.
1.1. Hanization through the dissolution of the traditional Hui Muslim community
The Hui people have been formed through their historically deep relationship with 
Han people (De Angelis 1997: 152-155; Jones-Leaning and Pratt 2012: 309-328). 
The residential distribution of Hui people is commonly stated as “spread widely and 
concentrated narrowly” (da fen can, xiao ji zhong [sic]) (Gladney 1996: 27).13 This 
means Hui people live in separate but relatively densely populated urban areas, in 
contrast for example with the large but sparsely populated areas such as is common for 
Tibetan or Uighur communities. Hui are widely distributed all over China. Historically, 
they formed their communities around a mosque. Hui people have lived surrounded by 
a large majority of Han people for a very long time. They lost their original language 
and now Mandarin is their mother tongue. Furthermore, they were made to change 
their original names to Chinese names during the Ming dynasty. Given these points, the 
history of Hui people might be considered to be the history of Hanization and certainly 
a profound Han inﬂuence cannot be ignored.
However, Islamic beliefs are considered to distinguish Hui people from Han people 
and they have long been maintained as grounds for collective or community identity. It 
is considered that Hui people traditionally form communities centering on community 
politics and religion. Moreover, such collectives are thought to form an autonomous 
community from Han society, seen in conditions such as the enforcement of a penal 
system based on Islamic law by the clergy (Iwamura 1949: 16-18), comprising Islamic 
norms, while taking into account the dominance of non-Islamic states.14 
Thus, the traditional Hui Muslim community has been adopted into the state governance 
system in modern China (De Angelis 1997: 158-163; Ashiwa and Wank 2009). The 
Hui community seriously suffered from the suppressive religious policies of the Anti-
Rightist Campaign and the Great Cultural Revolution which accelerated Hanization 
amongst Hui Muslims (De Angelis 1997: 161; Jones-Leaning and Pratt 2012: 318).15 
Moreover, Hanization is thought to have progressed even further since economic reform.
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The interface between Hui and Han people had already increased at the local level 
through the construction of the People’s Commune System (Renmin Gongshe) and then 
reform expanded more widely through rapid economic development and participation 
in the global economy following economic reform. Due to this situation, the subsequent 
changes in Hui society have attracted attention in Hui Muslim Studies, such as the 
decline in the proportion of Hui people living together around the mosque and a 
marked increase in shared living quarters between Hui people and Han people through 
various urban area developments, especially since the economic reforms were enforced 
(Ma and Jin 1997; Ma 2003; Liang 2006). Consequently, it is common for researchers 
to contend that the social structure of the Hui community has basically been dismantled 
(Zhou and Ma 2004). This social situation can be observed in Kunming. Although there were 
traditional Hui Muslim communities centered around mosques in urban areas of Kunming 
at least until the 1950s (Song 1985), after the 1950s urban development progressively 
dismantled the social structure of such communities, especially after the 1990s (Kunming-shi 
Zongjiao Shiwu-ju and Kunming-shi Yisilan-jiao Xiehui 2005: 150-152).16 Thus, the 
dissolution of traditional Hui communities increasingly estranged Hui people from mosque 
life and intensiﬁed the relations between Hui and Han in their everyday lives, especially in 
urban areas. For example, one can see such instances in the intermarriage between both Hui 
and Han. Consequently, it is commonly thought in Hui Muslim studies that the Hui people 
were Hanized (Hu 1997; Ma and Jin 1997: 29-30).17 In fact, many Hui Muslims abandoned 
Islamic practice in gaining employment or being educated outside of Islamic institutions. 
In this sense, such increasing commitment to mainstream society where Han people are 
dominant has also brought about secularization among Hui Muslims. For instance, Wang 
Xuan (a Hui female in her twenties), who works for a company in Kunming, continues to 
follow Islamic practices such as praying and wearing the hijab in her hometown located in 
a rural area with a concentrated population of Hui Muslims. However, she does not follow 
basic Islamic practices in Kunming. She explained the reason in the language of cause and 
effect: “…because if I wear a hijab (Dai Gaitou), I can not ﬁnd a job”.
Hui Muslim society faces a situation whereby the shift in relationships brought about 
by a wide variety of social changes has emerged in tandem with economic reform. In 
fact, Hui people must inexorably be in contact with the Han cultural others, with ideas 
of a secular society, and with complex economic conditions. Therefore, they are forced 
to live in a heterogeneous world; a world that contains cultural others or religious 
impurities. However, countering these realities that the Hui Muslims are living with, 
as discussed below, strict and comprehensive religious discourse, or Salafi religious 
discourse, simultaneously inﬂuences Hui Muslim society against diversiﬁcation.
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1.2. Islamic revival in the Post-Mao era and the inﬂuence of Salaﬁ religious discourse
A rapid revival of religion has occurred through relaxation of CCP religious policies 
since the late 1970s. This is a noticeable reaction to the Great Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) in which religion was suppressed. The policies of reform and opening 
called Gaige Kaifang introduced by Deng Xiaoping in December 1978 included a 
relaxation of restriction on religious practice. The CCP’s theory and approach toward 
religion was formalized in a 1982 CCP directive called On the Basic Viewpoint and 
Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period (Document 19) 
(Ashiwa and Wank 2009: 10-11). Religious liberty was recovered, though it still 
functioned within conditions controlled by the government.18 This situation is also true 
of Kunming. For example, mosque real estate that was requisitioned by the government 
during the Great Cultural Revolution began to be returned to religious groups. This 
has been the case in Kunming since 1983. Moreover, the government offered funds 
for rebuilding and/or repairing mosques (Kunming-shi Zongjiao Shiwu-ju and 
Kunming Yisilan-jiao Xiehui 2005: 136-138). Such religious liberty has been basically 
maintained for about thirty years.19  
This transition in religious policy became a primary factor that brought about a revival 
in religion. Statistically speaking, the number of authorized mosques and clergymen 
in Kunming have increased from forty places and eighty persons respectively in 
1989 (Kunming-shi Renmin Zhengfu (ed.) 1990: 108), to 133 places and 183 persons 
respectively in 2007 (Kunming-shi Renmin Zhengfu (ed.) 2008: 167). This illustrates 
one element of religious revival in China. Moreover, the number of pilgrims to Mecca has 
been rapidly increasing every year since 1989. Pilgrims to Mecca in Kunming increased 
from a mere two in 1989 (Kunming-shi Renmin Zhengfu (ed.) 1990: 108) to 113 in 2009.20 
With this Islamic revival, a more rigid religious discourse and/or Salafi religious 
discourse has become increasingly inﬂuential in Hui society. One of the factors in the 
increasing prominence of these discourses is the inﬂuence of clergy who have studied 
abroad.21 Salafi mosques have been established in some areas of Yunnan province 
over the last twenty years. These Salaﬁ mosques intend to rigidify scriptural religious 
practice. Moreover, they reject the Sinicized Islamic practices that are shared amongst 
the majority of Hui Muslims. These popular religious groups are known as Gedimu 
sects and they engage in practices such as the distribution of money during funerals 
and so on. Salafi discourse is very powerful because it is seen to refer to orthodox 
Islam amongst Hui Muslims. Although there is no Salaﬁ mosque in Kunming, Salaﬁ 
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religious discourse has influenced the thought of Hui Muslims in Kunming where 
inter-sect contacts occur amongst those who are from various places. Therefore, rigid 
religious morals inﬂuenced by Salaﬁ discourse have become a leading trend in debates 
surrounding the formation of religious norms and values in Kunming. Moreover, 
increased participation in the pilgrimage to Mecca mentioned above has promoted this 
conservative trend. Furthermore, access to religious knowledge has been facilitated 
through the spread of Islamic literature such as the translation of foreign Islamic 
thought (De Angelis 1997: 162) and Islamic websites.22 
Consequently, the proliferation of religious knowledge amongst ordinary Muslims, 
combined with the increase in daily contact with Han people, has resulted in the 
“objectification of Muslim consciousness” amongst part of Hui Muslim society 
(Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 37-45). Such experience is referred to as Renshi Anla 
(recognize Allah) in my ﬁeld site. The main criterion for being Muslim has become the 
strict practice of faith in Islam through objectiﬁcation. In other words, ‘being Muslim’ 
has not been an inherent Hui attribute until recently. Therefore, Hui Muslims who 
recognize Allah do not regard Hanized Hui Muslims as Muslims. 
Na Jun (a Hui male in his twenties) who works in a website design company in 
Kunming was raised in a secularized home. His parents and many of his relatives are 
unable to engage in basic Islamic practices such as prayer. However, he “recognized 
Allah” through contact with pious Hui Muslims, and started learning Islamic scriptures 
and practices by himself in literature and on websites. He often claimed that “[m]ost 
Hui Muslims in Kunming are not ‘Muslim’. They only avoid eating pork, (and engage 
in no other Islamic practices)”. Moreover, he described them with terms such as Hanized 
(Hanhua) and false (Jiade) Muslims. According to pious Hui Muslims like Na Jun,
they are not able to worship correctly and know nearly nothing about Islam.
1.3. Fragmentation amongst Hui Muslims
As a result of the two contrary tendencies as stated above, Hui Muslims have 
become fragmented.23 Specifically, while on the one hand many Hui Muslims have 
secularized like Wang Xuan, on the other hand, another part of Hui Muslim society 
has progressively Islamized such as Na Jun. Therefore, two key differences exist, 
separating the categories of secularized and Islamized groups. However, because, 
naturally, they all share the same popular ethnic category of being Hui people, there 
is a certain cultural commensurability or habitus of Islamic tradition amongst them. 
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Moreover, some of them are connected through other relationships such as kinship. It 
is not possible to simply or absolutely divide Hui Muslim society into homogeneous 
categories. Nevertheless, these two key differences do affect Kunming Hui Muslims in 
both their religious discourse and their social life as outlined in what follows.
Firstly, these two types, or groups, of Hui Muslim only loosely share the same sense of 
religion. For the Hanized Hui, religion is essentially a mental belief; in general they are 
not concerned about Islamic practices. For instance, although Wang Xuan abandoned 
Islamic practice due to her job, notwithstanding, she regards herself a Muslim. During 
an interview she claimed, “…though I don’t wear a headscarf now, the important thing 
is that religious belief is in my mind” (Xinyang Zai Neixin). However, the Islamized 
Hui Muslims such as Na Jun do not necessarily regard the Hui people like Wang Xuan 
as Muslim. Because for Islamized Hui Muslims, religion is an overarching life-style 
and one that very much governs everyday practice. In other words, being Muslim for 
them requires consistent religiosity. Therefore, many of them disdain Hanized Hui 
Muslims like Wang Xuan.
Secondly, there are basically no points of physical contact between these two types 
of Hui Muslims in the religious network centered around the existing government-
authorized mosques. Islamized Hui Muslims are regularly in contact via mosques 
through Friday prayers or Islamic festivals. In other words, they form a religious 
network centered on mosque life. However, this network is not the same as the 
traditional Hui Muslim community. As stated above, because most Hui Muslims do 
not live around mosques, the present religious network is composed of pious Muslims 
who deliberately and regularly come to the mosque to participate in religious activities. 
Thus, secularized individuals are not part of this religious network as they rarely 
participate in mosque religious activities.
However, one key question I will attempt to address in my research is: does Islamic 
revival just bring about pietization of a part of Hui Muslims? Moreover, do Hui 
Muslims remain fragmented as seems to be the case? Not necessarily is the rather 
complex answer to both questions. I will now turn to one concrete example regarding 
partial association of Hui Muslims through an Internet community.
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2. Partial association through the Hui Muslim Internet community
As mentioned above, traditional Hui Muslim communities were progressively 
dismantled after China’s economic reform. Consequently, mosques were not regularly 
frequented by many secularized Hui Muslims in Kunming. Thus, it was difﬁcult to gain 
access to Muslims beyond mosque clergy members and some pious Hui Muslims when 
I ﬁrst started ﬁeldwork. Given this situation, halāl restaurants were a valuable place to 
easily gain access to ordinary Hui Muslims. At times it seemed that the only speciﬁc 
places in which Hui people gathered, in addition to mosques, were halāl restaurants 
in the urban areas of Kunming. As far as I know, there is a poster advertising a Hui 
Muslim Internet community called The Kunming Hui People QQ Group (Kunming Hui-zu 
QQ-qun) in every halāl restaurant.24 This poster makes this Internet community public in 
Hui Muslim society. This particular poster is composed of two parts: an advertisement 
designed to attract new members and an introduction to the activities of the community 
with the schedule of Islamic festivals and activities alongside a Western calendar. 
This community was formed through a chat group of Kunming Hui Muslims and 
the Kunming Community BBS. Both were established in 2005. The Kunming Hui 
website was established five years later in 2010. The community had one thousand 
two hundred members in May 2011. Members exchange various types of information 
through this Internet community, as, for instance, religious activities, shops offering 
halāl foods, job opportunities, matchmaking events and so on. The participants mainly 
hold recreational activities, such as hiking, meeting for dinner, sports events and so on. 
Thus, members often meet one another through these activities in person so there is 
not much anonymity.25 Therefore, this community is not a virtual form of Hui Muslim 
community spread throughout China, but in fact exists as a real or embodied Hui 
Muslim community localized in Kunming. Although mosques are obviously considered 
religious spaces, this online ‘religious’ community has come to play a kind of social 
role that leads fragmented Hui Muslims to associate in Kunming.
2.1. Associating through common interests
In the beginning, The Kunming Hui People QQ Group was mainly established and 
set up by a group of secularized Hui Muslims with the object of promoting solidarity 
among dispersed Hui people through recreational events such as dinner parties. In 
fact, many of their early activities were secular activities. Although numerous initial 
members of this Internet community were Hanized, it is through this mode of meeting 
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that pious Hui Muslims have also gradually come to participate in the activities of 
this virtual-cum-embodied community. The reason is that regardless of whether one is 
pious or not, all Hui people share common interests as a speciﬁc minority in an urban 
area. These common interests can be categorized into two types. One is rooted in the 
desire to have employment. As stated above, Hui people have to commit more and 
more to existing in a mainstream society that largely consists of a Han majority in the 
Post-Mao era. Given these conditions, job hunting has become a major problem for the 
Hui, because many companies shrink away from employing them due to their respect 
of Islamic commandments; such as the prohibition of eating pork and drinking alcohol, 
or the requirement to pray and fast, and where even wearing the headscarf can become 
an issue. Therefore, Wang Xuan, mentioned above, had to abandon Islamic practice 
when seeking employment. However, because it is extremely difficult for pious Hui 
Muslims to do this, they have to find a way to cope with both Islamic practice and 
the workplace. One solution is to work for a company managed by Hui people; the 
managers of Hui Muslims, regardless of whether they are pious or not, are generally 
tolerant of Islamic practices. Therefore, as stated below, pious Hui Muslims who 
participate in the activities of this Internet community in order to seek employment, 
remain dissatisﬁed with secularized Hui Muslims.
The third anniversary party of the Kunming Hui Muslim Internet Community was held 
in November 2008. This party took place in one of the largest and most ostentatious 
halāl restaurants in Kunming. Entertainment for the party was primarily composed 
of over ten shows put on by members. More than eight hundred Hui people attended 
this party and about one hundred of them participated directly in the shows. The 
performances had few overtly Islamic elements. Indeed, most of the performances had 
nothing to do with Islam at all. Moreover, most of the female performers not only did 
not wear headscarves, but also wore skirts and short-sleeved tops baring their arms and 
legs. However, this party was representative of other recreational activities arranged 
through this Internet community, and such wide-scale participation and questionable 
attire can be seen in other activities.
It was obvious that pious or Islamized Hui Muslims did not feel comfortable with this 
situation. Ma Min (a Hui female university student in her twenties), an informant, 
attended the party with me. She is a very pious Muslim who always wears a headscarf 
and does not miss daily prayers. She felt the behavior of the many non-pious Hui 
people was scandalous. She emphatically claimed, “[m]any of them (the members 
of this Internet community) can not worship. And furthermore, some of them even 
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drink and smoke. The only thing that is pious about them is that they do not eat pork”. 
Moreover, she constantly repeated in a sullen way, “I don’t like this type of gathering 
of Hui people, because they are all Hui people but they are not all Muslim”. Thus, she 
certainly held a critical view of The Kunming Hui People QQ Group. On the other 
hand, however, she also recognized the advantage of participating in this community. 
At one point, she said with a laugh, “…but there are good things in joining this group. 
It is possible to get to know various kinds of people, which is useful because they 
might serve us well in helping ﬁnd a job”. This was a concern weighing on her as she 
was a university undergraduate at the time. The other pious Hui women who attended 
the party with her were also seeking employment.
Another common interest for the Hui minority is the search for marriage partners. 
Although marriage arranged by one’s parents is popular in rural areas where traditional 
Hui Muslim communities remain centered around mosque life, it is difﬁcult to arrange 
marriage between Hui Muslims in the city of Kunming where the community has 
already been dismantled. Hui people are distributed around Kunming, and their lives 
are intertwined with those of Han people. Moreover, they do not necessarily have 
contact with Hui people in their everyday lives. This situation is applicable not only 
to secularized Hui Muslims, who basically do not join in mosque-based religious 
activities, but also pious Hui Muslims who regularly go to the mosque for religious 
activities. Religious places do not play the role of venue for male and female Hui 
Muslims to meet, in large part, because Friday prayer worship and Islamic festivals 
are only a duty for Muslim males. Hui youth basically lack opportunities to encounter 
members of the opposite sex in their daily lives. As a result, the search for a marriage 
partner has become another major problem, as well as employment, for most of the 
Hui Muslim youth of Kunming. Therefore, single youths in this Internet community 
regularly hold matchmaking activities (Danshen Lianyi Huodong) such as hiking, 
dinner parties and similar events. Ma Xian (a single Hui male in his twenties) is a 
middle school teacher and a pious Muslim who never misses Friday prayers. He told 
me during an activity, “it is too difﬁcult to ﬁnd a marriage partner for a Muslim in urban 
areas like Kunming. So these kinds of activities are necessary for us in order to meet”.
Moreover, this is a problem that extends beyond unmarried youth, because the elderly 
are concerned about the Hanization of Hui youth through the intermarriage of Hui 
people and Han people. About one and a half months after the party, Jin Shu (a Hui 
male in his sixties) who is a member of this Internet community and an officer of a 
mosque in Kunming, conveyed in a pleased tone, “I’m very happy, because I heard 
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some very good news recently. You know, they say that a couple has been formed by 
taking advantage of that party”. It shows how marriage is a big problem for all Hui 
Muslims regardless of their generation or dedication to religiosity in Kunming. So the 
first matchmaking party (Xiangqin-hui) was held by a Hui matchmaking company26 
and the youth of this Internet community in collaboration with the mosque clergy in 
a mosque restaurant.27
In sum, these diverse Hui Muslims are mediated via their Internet community and 
they are often brought into association through the numerous common interests they 
share as a particular minority in an urban area. As noted above the website is beneﬁcial 
for mutual needs such as job opportunities and marriage prospects. However this 
association is just partial and they remain fragmented as a community, because not only 
do they lack the same sense of religion, but beyond this, many pious Muslims regard 
secularized members with contempt. Therefore, the Hui Muslim Internet community is 
not rooted in cohesion and homogeneity, but is in fact heterogeneous in character both 
in religious and secular frames. Notwithstanding, this collective has come to play a role 
in Islamic revival.
2.2. Development of socially useful activities or Waqf activities
As stated above, the first activities promoted by this Hui Muslim Internet Community 
had few specifically Islamic characteristics. However, as Islamized Muslims came to 
participate in the activities, the online community gradually became tinged with religious 
sensibility. For example, as the circulation of religious information increased, pious Hui 
Muslims even came to depend on this community site for obtaining religious information. 
The following concrete example shows how the Internet is important as an agent of 
emerging Hui sociality. During fieldwork, I attended several Islamic ceremonies. Every 
time I went to the mosque to attend a ceremony, I noticed participation of at least two 
hundred Muslims. However, I was surprised when only about thirty men and women came 
to the mosque to participate in an important religious activity called The Day of Ashura 
(Ashula-ri) in December of 2009.28 I wanted to know why there were so few participants 
compared with the high numbers I was accustomed to seeing. One of my informants 
named Ma Bin is a Hui male in his twenties. He is a pious Muslim and prays daily without 
fail, he is also one of the members of the Hui Muslim Internet community. He explained 
the reason for the poor turnout was that: “nobody was notiﬁed about the Day of Ashura via 
the Internet, so few people came today. But I assure you if the ceremony was posted on the 
Internet, like it usually is, then many more people would probably have come”. 
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The Hui Muslim Internet community has come to play not only a role of mediation of 
religious information, but also an actual role in some of the religious activities. One of 
these is to assist in the celebration of Mawlid or Birth of the Prophet (Shengdan-jie). 
This Islamic festival is the largest of all the Islamic festivals in Kunming. However, 
only a few Muslims come to the mosque to attend the overtly religious ritual during 
the festival. The participants do not necessarily need to perform any religious activity 
in this festival. Therefore, many Hui Muslims come to the mosque just for the meal 
offered by the mosque.29 Nevertheless, clergymen and some non-ordained Muslims 
recite passages from the Qur’an and clergymen read sermons. This is unlike other 
festivals such as Eid ul-Fitr, the holiday marking the end of Ramadan (Kaizhai-jie), 
whereby Muslims must go to the mosque in order to pray.30 The fact that Mawlid is the 
largest festival and does not require participants to attend religious activities reﬂects the 
progressive secularization of many Hui Muslims. More to the point, a great deal of help 
is needed in order to provide a large number of diners with a meal and the members 
of the Hui Muslim Internet community often play this role. Without them, it would be 
impossible to hold the festival nowadays; for example, nearly one hundred volunteers 
composed of Internet community members and university students assisted in serving 
during the festival at a mosque in 2009.31 
The main reason why the Internet community plays a role in this religious event is due 
to the admission of some Islamized Hui Muslims, especially Ma Qing who worked for 
an NGO on an earlier occasion. Thus, some new members had previous experience 
with volunteering and this ethos was introduced to the community, especially notable, 
as such programs began in 2007 when she and many other pious Muslims joined. For 
example, in addition to the activities mentioned above, various new activities such as 
the offering of ﬁnancial support to Dakwah movements from Hui Muslim university 
students, offering aid and support to Hui living in deprived areas, helping out elderly 
Muslims in need, holding matchmaking parties as mentioned above, and even engaging 
in reforestation work on a mountain with a Muslim graveyard in Kunming are some of 
the events started by these members. 
These activities are called ‘socially useful activities’ (Gongyi Huodong) by the members. 
The human and financial resources for these activities come from the Hui Muslim 
Internet community and are collected on the community website. However, it is 
clear that these philanthropic efforts are regarded by Ma Qing and the other pious 
Muslims as part of the propagation of the Islamic faith or viewed as a kind of Islamic 
revival movement. For example, Ma Qing confided; “Many Hui people don’t know 
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what Islam is, because they have never received (religious) education. So I want 
to encourage the development of Islam and Muslim society through education and 
culture”. Thus, Ma Qing aims to assist in the development of Muslim society and Islam 
through the furtherance of Islamic faith. These kinds of religious activities developed 
into a movement to establish an NGO. Their plan is to form an NGO that essentially 
functions like a Waqf.32 The raison d’être of this movement can be traced back to a 
shared view that mosques which almost monopolize acceptance of Zakāt (mandatory 
charity) do not aptly function as an institution of religious redistribution. Because 
mosque religious activities are restricted by government, they cannot always effectively 
answer the needs of ordinary people. In fact, mosques are often criticized by ordinary 
Muslims who commonly say such things as “only mosques become richer and richer”. 
Therefore, their goal was to widen the scale of activities to suit common people’s needs 
and help to provide a stable revenue source for their activities through transforming this 
Internet community into ‘an acquirer institute’ of Zakāt functioning as Waqf. Although 
this attempt to organize Waqf activities somewhat met with failure in terms of religious 
conversion, the activities were largely successful and are still ongoing.33
On the other hand, secularized Hui Muslims who participate in or ﬁnancially support 
these activities do not necessarily share the vision of more pious members like Ma Qing. 
For instance, many of them explain their motivation for the activities as just “to do 
volunteer work” simply in and for itself without religious signiﬁcance. Alternatively, 
for them, the signiﬁcance of the activities for the well-being and solidarity of the ethnic 
group is often emphasized. For example, Ma Hai (a Hui male in his thirties) told me 
in a simple and straightforward manner that “…it is good that Hui people help each 
other” in relation to the group’s work in consoling people at a nursing home for the 
elderly located in a mosque. These Hui Muslims are not necessarily pious. Indeed, 
many hardly engage in Islamic practices such as prayer or wearing the headscarf even 
during such activities. A prime example of this was when, despite it being prayer time 
and despite the fact that they were in a mosque, Ma Hai and the other participants 
did not go to worship. Again, Islamized Hui Muslims have a tendency to negatively 
evaluate impious or secularized Hui Muslims and are unwilling to cooperate with 
them. However, Islamized Hui Muslims need to involve secularized Hui Muslims in 
their religiously oriented activities in order just to maintain or extend them; ironically, 
without their secular help, there would be few religious events. Some pious members 
are well aware of this dynamic, noted for example when Ma Li (a Hui female in her 
thirties) who is a friend of Ma Qing admonished members who were dissatisfied by 
the cooperation offered by secularized Hui Muslims. When the members who lead 
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Waqf activities held a meeting for their action plan in December 2009 she said “we 
should not belittle the members of the QQ group (the Kunming Hui Muslim Internet 
Community) because they are not Muslim. Their inﬂuence is getting more and more 
powerful (among the Hui Muslim society in Kunming)”.
Thus, useful social activities or Waqf activities have arisen within the Hui Muslim 
Internet Community. Moreover, though this online community just carried out secular 
activities to begin with, the community has come to play a signiﬁcant role in religion, 
even earning some reluctant recognition from Islamized Muslims like Ma Qing. It 
should be highlighted here, however, that the admission of pious Muslims into the 
community did not bring about Islamization among the members, but pious Muslims 
and Hanized Muslims did in fact become partially associated through their participation 
in this online community. Moreover, the perspectives of both Hui groups, secularized 
and Islamized, participating in the Internet community, virtually or in the ﬂesh, remains 
different. In other words, on the one hand, for secularized Hui Muslims, the Waqf 
activities are basically philanthropic activities for the mutual aid of Hui Muslims. On 
the other hand, from the perspective of Islamized Hui Muslims, these activities are 
rooted in Islamic revival movements directed towards the development and promotion 
of Islam; in short, they regard all these activities as part of missionary work. The 
central point underscored by these ethnographic cases is that the Hui people associated 
via this internet community do not necessarily have the same intention when engaging 
in the same activities within the community. 
Conclusion: Entanglements of the Islamic and the secular
The traditional mosque-centric social structure in Hui Muslim society has been 
dismantled to a great extent through economic reform in China. As such, there has 
been an expansion of Hui people’s commitment to mainstream society centered on the 
dominant Han people. This social change inﬂuenced many Hui in becoming Hanized. 
Consequently, the change brought about secularization among Hui Muslims. On the 
other hand, rigid Islamic discourse like Salafi religious discourse has come to have 
progressively more impact on Hui Muslim society through the influence of clergy 
who studied abroad and the proliferation of religious media such as Islamic literature 
and Islamic websites. This has led to a rise in rigid or conservative religious discourse 
brought about via the Islamization or pietization of part of Hui Muslim society. These 
contrary tendencies have fostered fragmentation amongst Hui Muslims not only on 
religious discourse but also in their everyday lives. 
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The Hui Muslim Internet community has started to draw both factions of Hui Muslims 
into association. It is a virtual space in which real meetings are spurred on by their 
partially shared needs and demands as an ethnic and religious minority living in an 
urban area. I have proposed some concrete examples of such needs as employment 
opportunities and marriage prospects. Thus this online community associates these 
two groups of Hui Muslims, even though they remain fragmented, who share certain 
interests as a minority while differing in terms of sense of religiosity and lifestyle 
as Muslim. In fact, Islamized Hui Muslims clearly do not feel comfortable about 
secularized Hui Muslims. Thus, their association via the Internet community is partial 
and forms a ‘fragmented collective’. The Hui Muslim Internet community shows 
an uncomfortable and contested sociality of Hui people; a sociality that entangles 
both Islamic and secular elements. This online community is not a substitute for the 
traditional Hui Muslim community that was dismantled through social change in the 
post-Mao era. Instead it is a new or novel network loosely bridging the Hui Muslim 
community divides of the religious and the secular. Hence, the Internet not only affects 
religion, bringing about Islamization or pietization through the facilitation of access to 
religious knowledge as previous literatures have argued, but also has a tangible effect 
on society causing each sphere of Hui life to participate in or extend into the other.
Islamic revival movements such as Waqf activities have arisen from such Islamic and 
secular entanglements. That is to say, Islamic revival movements cannot, and should 
not, be reduced to a rising or even a shared sense of religiosity as previous literatures 
have interpreted. Islamic revival movements progress because of partial associations 
between the secular and the religious rather than because of increased Islamization 
or pietization of Muslims in the dominant secular world. Moreover, Islam, revived 
in this context, is not necessarily doctrinal or scriptural Islam but Islam in the public 
sense (Salvatore and Eickelman 2006). As stated above, Islamic revival has progressed 
through ‘useful social activities’ implicated in both philanthropic and religious 
purposes. In other words, Islam entangles the various intentions of diverse Muslims 
including secularized Muslims and so it is evident that Waqf activities can involve 
actors across the religious and the secular divide.
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1 Islamic clergymen are called Ahong in Chinese. The etymology of Ahong comes from the Persian word ākhund 
which means a scholar or a teacher. Ahong are individuals who have a government-issued license to preach 
Islamic education in ofﬁcially authorized mosques or Islamic schools. Such an education takes about four years 
for accreditation in Yunnan province.
2 However, religious embodied knowledge is missing in this new form of connectivity. For example, Qinggan 
Jinbai (affective worship) is valued amongst Hui Muslims in my field site. Affective worship is thought to be 
cultivated not through studying the teachings of Islam accessible through this new form of connectivity but 
through collective prayer such as Friday prayers. 
3 The Islamic clergy also have access to the Internet. But it seems that the influence of the Internet is stronger 
amongst ordinary Muslims, at least in my ﬁeld site.
4 For example, Hirschkind (2001) argued that listening to a sermon on cassette plays an important role for ethical 
self-improvement in Egypt.
5 Eickelman (1992) argued that the spread of mass education de-monopolized access to religious texts which had, 
until then, been monopolized by ulama.
6 Engelke (2010) reviewed such recent developments in religion in his “Religion and the media turn”.
7 For an example relating to Chinese Muslims see Gillette (2000) who argued that Islamization (or Arabization) is 
coincident with modernization.
8 The concept of the clash of civilizations popularized by Huntington (1996) is representative. Secularization theory 
also includes a similar view on religion; that it is incompatible with modernity. In other words, secularization 
theory contends that religion is by necessity in decline in the modern world (Pollack 2008).
9 Bayat (2005) addressed each perspective as anti-modern and postmodern. Soares and Osella (2009) reviewed the 
broad changes in the theoretical framework of Islamic studies, especially focusing on anthropological debates 
about the relationship between Islam and politics.
10 The Hui are one of the ethnic Muslim minorities in China. Almost all Hui people are Muslim.
11 I conducted ﬁeldwork working in Mandarin and in Yunnan dialects of Chinese.
12 All of the Hui people that are referenced in this paper are self-proclaimed Muslims. Therefore I do not distinguish 
between Hui people and Hui Muslims which is important to note for the sake of clarity.
13 In general, it is da fen san, xiao ji zhong (大分散、小集中).
14 For example, Bloomhall, who carried out missionary work with Chinese Muslims in the late period of the Qing 
Dynasty in China, recorded that they merely formally kotowed to the idol of the emperor (Bloomhall 1910: 228).
15 Muslims were prohibited from religious activities, such as prayers and Islamic festivals (Eid), and mosques were 
confiscated in Kunming by the government in this period (Kunming-shi Zongjiao Shiwu-ju and Kunming-shi 
Yisilan-jiao Xiehui 2005: 129-135).
16 This tendency continues today. For example, the largest Muslim area in Kunming was also destroyed through 
urban development in 2009.
17 It has been argued in Hui Muslim studies that Hanization brings about a dilution of the sense of religiosity or 
Muslim identity. In this sense, Hanization leads to secularization (Pollack 2008: 2-4).
18 For example, religious activities are only permitted in authorized religious institutes called Zongjiao Huodong 
Changsuo (Ashiwa and Wank 2009: 11).
19 However, religious policies have been tightened since the late 1990s because of the inﬂuence of the Tiananmen 
Square Incident (Sawai 2010: 72-74).
20 I obtained this statistic from a mosque during ﬁeldwork.
21 Salaﬁ (Salafei in Chinese) is called Santai (raising three times) by Gedimu. Santai is derived from the difference 
in the method of prayer between Salaﬁ and Gedimu. While Salaﬁ members raise their hands three times in prayer, 
Gadimu members raise their hands only once. The Gedimu method originated from Hanaﬁ.
22 Islamic websites have successively been established especially since the year 2000. Among the many websites my 
informants often use are: Zhong Mu Wang [Chinese Muslim Website] (www.2muslim.com/), Yisilan zhi Guang 
[The Light of Islam] (www.norislam.com/), Yisilan zhi Chuang [The Window of Islam] (www.yslzc.com/). The 
oldest is Yisilan zhi Guang. It has been online since 1999.
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23 Hui people were fragmented much earlier. The category of Hui people as one nationality (minzu) was politically 
created by the CCP in the 1930s. The CCP was struggling for supremacy with the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist 
Party), the Japanese army and the military clique of the Hui people (they were not regarded as a nationality by the 
Guomindang government) at that time. Additionally, the CCP admitted the right to national self-determination for 
each nationality. In this situation, the CCP tried to gain support from the Chinese Muslim people by authorizing 
them as a nationality. As a result, the Hui people became a nationality after 1949 (Matsumoto 1999: 171-239). 
However, the question of whether the Hui people were indeed a nationality had been discussed before the Hui 
people became a nationality through this sequence of events, because they can be distinguished from Han people 
only in religious belief (Kimura 2009). In fact, Gladney who carried out fieldwork in four regions of China 
revealed the socio-cultural diversity among the Hui people in each region (Gladney 1996).
24 QQ is an abbreviation of Tencent QQ. This is the most popular free instant messaging software across China.
25 Moreover the use of QQ requires mutual recognition between members and in my ﬁeld site, members’ numbers 
are exchanged like mobile phone numbers in Japan.
26 This company was established by Ma Qing (a Hui female entrepreneur in her thirties) and some members of the Internet 
community in 2009. Thereafter the company has regularly held matchmaking parties in mosques or halāl restaurants.
27 Five of six mosques in the Kunming urban area have halāl restaurants inside the mosque. This is because Muslims 
have a meal during Islamic festivals or during Ramadan (Zhaiyue). In addition to this, such restaurants are a source 
of income for the mosques. Each mosque rents facilities to merchants providing a source of income since the 1990s.
28 The Day of Ashura is composed of the following activities: ﬁrst, clergymen and ordinary Muslims who can read 
the Qur’an recite passages from the Qur’an together before Isha’ prayer or night prayer (Xiaoli or Huofutan). The 
text is divided into thirty volumes (Kaijing); second, they sing “A song of praise to Muhammad” (Zansheng); 
third, clergymen preach a sermon in relation to that day; fourth, all the participants carry out Isha prayer. They 
successively do Nafl prayer or an optional prayer (Fugongbai) of twelve Rak’a (units of movement during the 
Muslim prayer) after the initial prayer. Fifth, they do Witr prayer (Weiteer), and then offer up Du’a or a prayer of 
supplication (Dua). Finally, they partake of rice gruel together, which is offered by the mosque.
29 However this meal is not free. One needs to a buy a meal ticket (about ten Chinese Yuan).
30 There were just ﬁve or six hundred participants of Eid ul-Fitr at the same mosque in 2009.
31 Although about ten years ago every mosque had boarders with the aim of becoming clergymen, and moreover they had 
played the role in Kunming, through government direction, only one mosque per sect has boarders now. Therefore the 
other mosques have to depend on volunteers such as members of the online community in order to hold festivals.
32 A Waqf is essentially an operating system for an Islamic endowment utilized for religious or charitable purposes 
(Hoexter 2002). However my informants basically do not use the term: Waqf. Nevertheless, their activities can be 
seen as a kind of Waqf. For example, they explained that the NGO functions as a group that especially collects and 
distributes Tian Ke (Zakāt, mandatory charity) in Islamic states. Therefore, I provisionally use this term in this paper.
33 Intervention by public security forces caused the failure of the organization of Waqf activities. It is said amongst 
ordinary Hui Muslims that clergymen who feared their concessions of Zakāt were threatened had lodged a 
complaint with the public security forces.
Bibliography
ANDERSON Jon W. (2003). The Internet and Islam’s New Interpreters. In: SALVATORE Armando 
and EICKELMAN Dale F. (eds.). New Media in the Muslim World: the Emerging 
Public Sphere. Second Edition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
ASHIWA Yoshiko and WANK David L. (2009). Making Religion, Making the State in 
Modern China: An Introductory Essay. In: ASHIWA Yoshiko and WANK David L. 
(eds.). Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China. 
California: Stanford University Press.
BAYAT Asef (2005). Islamism and Social Movement Theory. Third World Quarterly, 
vol.26, no.6.
BLOOMHALL Marshall (1910). Islam in China: A Neglected Problem. London: 
Morgan and Scott.
Fragmented yet Associated:
Waqf Activities in an Urban Hui Muslim Internet Community
- 55 -
DE ANGELIS Richard C. (1997). Muslims and Chinese Political Culture. The Muslim 
World, vol.87.
EICKELMAN Dale F. (1992). Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination 
in Contemporary Arab Societies. American Ethnologist, vol.19, no. 4.
EICKELMAN Dale F. and PISCATORI James (1996). Muslim Politics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
ENGELKE Matthew (2010). Religion and the media turn: A review essay. American 
Ethnologist, vol.37, no. 2.
GILLETTE Maris Boyd (2000). Between Mecca and Beijing: Modernization and 
Consumption among Urban Chinese Muslims. California: Stanford University Press.
GLADNEY Dru C. (1996). Muslim Chinese Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s 
Republic. Second Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Asian Center. (Harvard 
East Asian Monographs).
HIRSCHKIND Charles (2001). The Ethics of Listening: Cassette-Sermon Audition in 
Contemporary Egypt. American Ethnologist, vol.28, no.3.
HOEXTER Miriam (2002). The Waqf and the Public Sphere. In: HOEXTER Miriam, 
EISENSTADT Shmuel N. and LEVTZION Nehemia (eds.). The Public Sphere in 
Muslim Societies. New York: State University of New York Press.
HU Youze 虎有澤 (1997). Li-xian Huizu Diyu Neihun Diaocha Fawei 禮縣回族地域
內婚調查發微 [A Research Report on Hui Endogamy in Li prefecture]. Huizu Yanjiu 
回族研究 [Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Study], vol.28, no.4.
HUNTINGTON Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster.
IWAMURA Shinobu 岩村忍 (1949). Chûgoku Kaikyô Shakai no Kôzô (jô) 中国回教
社会の構造（上） [The Structure of Chinese Islam Society (vol.1)]. Tokyo: Nihon Hyôron sha.
JONES-LEANING Melanie and PRATT Douglas (2012). Islam in China: From Silk 
Road to Separatism. The Muslim World, vol.102.
KIMURA Mizuka 木村自 (2009). Taiwan Kaimin no Esunishiti to Shûkyô: 
Chûkaminkoku no Shutai kara Taiwan no Imin he 台湾回民のエスニシティと宗
教：中華民国の主体から台湾の移民へ [Ethnicity and Religion of Taiwan Muslim 
Minority: From the Subject in the Republic of China to the Immigrant in Taiwan]. In: 
SHOJI Hiroshi (ed.). Imin to tomoni Kawaru Chiiki to Kokka 移民とともに変わる
地域と国家（国立民族学博物館調査報告83） [Immigrants, Local Communities 
and the States: Transitions in Asia and Europe]. National Museum of Ethnology 
(Osaka). (Senri Ethnological Reports; 83).
Inter Faculty, vol.4, FRAGMENTATIONS 
- 56 -
KUNMING-SHI RENMIN ZHENGFU 昆明市人民政府 [The People’s Government 
of Kunming City]. (ed.). (1990). Kunming Nianjian 1990 昆明年鑒1990 [Kunming 
Yearbook 1990]. Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe.
KUNMING-SHI RENMIN ZHENGFU 昆明市人民政府 [The People’s Government 
of Kunming City]. (ed.). (2008). Kunming Nianjian 2008 昆明年鑒2008 [Kunming 
Yearbook 2008]. Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe.
KUNMING-SHI ZONGJIAO SHIWU-JU and KUNMING-SHI YISILAN-JIAO 
XIEHUI 昆明市宗教事務局・昆明市伊斯蘭教協會 [Religious Affairs Bureau 
of Kunming City and Kunming Islamic Association]. (eds.). (2005). Kunming-shi 
Yisilan-jiao Shi 昆明市伊斯蘭教史 [History of Kunming Islam]. Kunming: Yunnan 
Daxue Chubanshe.
LIANG Jingyu 良警宇 (2006). Niu-jie: Yi ge Chengshi Huizu Shequ de Bianqian 牛街：
一個城市回族社區的變遷 [Niu Street: the Change of an Urban Hui Community]. 
Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Daxue Chubanshe.
MA Shourong 馬壽榮 (2003). Dushi Huizu Shequ de Wenhua Bianqian: Yi Kunming-shi 
Shuncheng-jie Huizu Shequ Weili 都市回族社區的文化變遷：以昆明市順城
街回族社區為例 [Cultural Change in the Urban Hui Community: Taking the Hui 
Community of Shuncheng Street in Kunming as Examples]. Huizu Yanjiu 回族研究 
[Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Study], vol.52, no.4.
MA Zongbao and JIN Yinghua 馬宗保・金英花 (1997). Yinchuan Shiqu Hui-Han 
Minzu Juzhu Geju Bianqian ji Qi Dui Minzu-jian Shehui Jiaowang de Yingxiang 銀
川市區回漢民族居住格局變遷及其對民族間社會交往的影響 [The Change of 
Residential Constitution between Hui and Han and the influence of that on Inter-
ethnic Social Communications in Yinchuan]. Huizu Yanjiu 回族研究 [Journal of Hui 
Muslim Minority Study], vol.26, no.2.
MAHMOOD Saba (2005). Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist 
Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
MATSUMOTO Masumi 松本ますみ (1999). Chûgoku Minzoku Seisaku no Kenkyû: 
Shinmatsu kara 1945 nen made no “Minzoku-ron” wo Chûshinni 中国民族政策の
研究：清末から1945年までの「民族論」を中心に [The Study of China’s Ethnic 
Policy: with a Focus on “the Discourses on Ethnicity” from the End of the Qing 
Dynasty to 1945 ]. Tokyo: Taga Shuppan.
MEYER Birgit and MOORS Annelies (2006). Introduction. In: MEYER Birgit and 
MOORS Annelies (eds.). Religion, Media and the Public Sphere. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.
NAGATA Judith (1982). Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy among Rural 
Religious Elites in Malaysia. Man (N.S.), vol.17, no.4.
Fragmented yet Associated:
Waqf Activities in an Urban Hui Muslim Internet Community
- 57 -
POLLACK Detlef (2008). Introduction: Religious Change in Modern Societies: 
Perspectives Offered by the Sociology of Religion. In: POLLACK Detlef and OLSON 
Daniel V. A. (eds.). The Role of Religion in Modern Societies. New York: Routledge.
SALVATORE Armando and EICKELMAN Dale F. (2006). Public Islam and the 
Common Good. In: SALVATORE Armando and EICKELMAN Dale F. (eds.). Public 
Islam and the Common Good. Leiden: Brill.
SAWAI Mitsuo 澤井充生 (2010). Chûgoku Kyôsantô no Isurâmu Seisaku no Kako 
to Genzai: Neika Kaizoku Jichiku Ginsen-shi no Jirei 中国共産党のイスラーム
政策の過去と現在：寧夏回族自治区銀川市の事例 [The Past and the Present 
of Chinese Communist Party’s policies on Islam: A Case Study in Yinchuan-shi, 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region]. In: KONAGAYA Yuki, KAWAGUCHI Yukihiro 
and NAGANUMA Sayaka 小長谷有紀・川口幸大・長沼さやか (eds.). Chûgoku 
ni okeru Shakaishugi-teki Kindaika: Shûkyô, Shôhi, Esunishiti 中国における社会
主義的近代化：宗教・消費・エスニシティ [Socialistic Modernization in China: 
Religion, Consumption, Ethnicity]. Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan.
SONG Enchang 宋恩常 (1985). Jiefang-chu Kunming Huizu Shehui Jingji Diaocha 
解放初昆明回族社會經濟調查 [An investigation of Hui society and economy in 
Kunming in the early stages of Liberation]. In: YUNNAN-SHENG BIANJI-ZU 雲
南省編輯組 (ed.). Yunnan Huizu Shehui Lishi Diaocha (Yi) 雲南回族社會歷史調
查（一） [An Investigation of Hui Society and History in Yunnan Province, vol.1]. 
Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe.
TURNER Bryan S. (2010). Islam, Public Religion and the Secularization Debate. In: 
MARRANCI Gabriele (ed.). Muslim Societies and the Challenge of Secularization: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach. Dordrecht; Heidelberg; London; New York: Springer. 
(Muslims in Global Societies Series; 1).
YAGI Kumiko 八木久美子 (2011). Gurôbaru-ka to Isuramu: Ejiputo no “Zokujin” 
Sekkyôshi-tachi グローバル化とイスラム：エジプトの「俗人」説教師たち 
[Globalization and Islam: “Layman” Preachers in Egypt]. Kyoto: Sekai Shisou Sha.
ZHOU Chuanbin and MA Xuefeng 周傳斌・馬雪峰 (2004). Dushi Huizu Shehui 
Jiegou de Fanshi Wenti Tantao: Yi Beijing Huizu Shequ de Jiegou Bianqian Weili 都
市回族社會結構的範式問題探討：以北京回族社區的結構變遷為例 [A Paradigm 
Discussion on Social Structure of an Urban Hui Muslim Minority: As the Case of 
Beijing]. Huizu Yanjiu 回族研究 [Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Study], vol.55, no.3.
Inter Faculty, vol.4, FRAGMENTATIONS 
- 58 -
Internet sources
CNNIC 中國互聯網信息中心 [China Internet Network Information Center] (2002). Di 
Shiba-ci Zhonguo Hulianwang Fazhan Zhuangkuang Tongji Baogao 第十八次中國互
聯網發展狀況統計報告 [The eighteenth report of China Internet development statistics]
<www.cnnic.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201206/t20120612_26709.htm> (2012.08.14).
CNNIC 中國互聯網信息中心 [China Internet Network Information Center] (2012). Di 
Sanshi-ci Zhonguo Hulianwang Fazhan Zhuangkuang Tongji Baogao 第三十次中國互
聯網發展狀況統計報告 [The thirtieth report of China Internet development statistics]
<www.cnnic.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201207/P020120723477451202474.pdf> (2012.08.14).
